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This book examines the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada released in the calendar year 2000.1 The Court handed down a total of 72 
decisions in the 2000 calendar year, 13 of which were constitutional cases.2 This 
overall output was comparable to the 73 decisions released in 1999 (including 18 
constitutional cases), but far below the Court’s output throughout the 1990s, when 
the Court handed down an annual average of approximately 110 decisions. The 
Court sat a total of 57 days in 2000, which was up from 55 sitting days in 1999, 
_______________________________________________________________ 

  Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School; Affiliated Scholar, Davies Ward Phillips & 
Vineberg, LLP. Unless otherwise noted, the data and statistics referred to in this paper are based on 
research undertaken by student researchers of the Centre for Public Law and Public Policy of the 
Osgoode Hall Law School. This paper was originally presented at the April 6, 2001 conference entitled 
“2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth Annual Analysis of the Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” 
sponsored by the Professional Development Program at Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1 For present purposes, a case is considered to raise a “constitutional” issue when it involves 
the interpretation of a provision identified in the definition of the “Constitution of Canada” in section 
52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
2 The Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutional cases in the year 2000 were as follows: 
Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703; Arsenault-
Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3; Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia 
(Securities Commission), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494; Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950; Reference re 
Firearms Act (Canada), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783; R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90; Blencoe v. British 
Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307; Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. 
K.L.W., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519; R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium 
v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120; Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v. 
Alberta (Attorney General), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 409; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des 
droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits 
de la jeunesse) v. Boisbriand (City), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 
2 S.C.R. 764. 




but, again, significantly lower than the 1995-98 period, when the Court sat an 
average of 75 days per year.3  
Of the 13 constitutional cases in the year 2000, 10 were Charter cases, and four 
raised federalism issues.4 There were no aboriginal constitutional cases released by 
the court in the year 2000.5  
II. THE YEAR 2000 CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
1. Successful Versus Unsuccessful Charter Claims 
Three of the 10 Charter claims succeeded in 2000. However, only one of the 
three successful Charter claims involved legislation (Little Sisters), and even there 
the claimant’s success was rather limited. In Little Sisters, the majority of the 
Court struck down a “reverse onus” provision in the Customs Act, but upheld the 
remainder of the scheme from constitutional challenge. (The three dissenters, 
Iacobucci, Arbour and Lebel JJ., would have gone further and struck down a tariff 
classification prohibiting importation of obscene materials.) The fact that only a 
single statutory provision was ruled invalid in the year 2000 is consistent with the 
trends in recent years6 and reminds us that the majority of Charter litigation in the 
Supreme Court involves a challenge to government conduct or decisions, rather 
than the validity of an enactment of the legislature.  
The other Charter challenges involving a challenge to legislation (as opposed to 
government decisions or action), all of which were rejected in 2000, were as 
follows: Granovsky (in which the Court upheld a provision in the Canada Pension 
Plan that included periods of mental or physical disability in a claimant’s 
3 Also of interest is the fact that the length of time that it took for the Court to dispose of cases 
in 2000 was the highest in a decade. On average, 23.7 months elapsed from the time of the filing of an 
application for leave to appeal and final judgment, as compared with 21.7 months in 1999 and 18.7 
months in 1998. The greatest portion of this increased length of time over the past two years is due to 
two factors: the Court is taking longer to dispose of leave to appeal applications, and it is keeping 
decisions under reserve for significantly longer periods of time than was the case two years ago. For 
example, in 1998, the elapsed time between the hearing and judgment averaged 2.8 months, while in 
2000 that number more than doubled, to 5.8 months. 
4 The two categories total 14 since one case (Lovelace) is classified as both a Charter and a 
federalism case. The other federalism cases were: Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia 
(Securities Commission), supra, note 2; Reference re Firearms Act (Canada) and Public School 
Boards’ Assn. of Alberta, supra, note 2. The Charter cases consisted of Lovelace as well as the 
remaining nine cases identified in footnote 2 above.  
5 Lovelace v. Ontario is classified as an equality rights case, since it involved the interpretation 
of section 15 of the Charter as opposed to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Further, while 
Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 633, raised issues involving aboriginal peoples, it did 
not involve the interpretation of a constitutional provision, and thus is not included in the analysis here. 
6 See the discussion of this point in Monahan, “The Supreme Court of Canada in the 21st 
Century” (2000), 80 Can. Bar Rev. 374. 
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contributory periods); Lovelace (in which the Court upheld a scheme for the 
division of proceeds from the Casino Rama project in Orillia, Ontario); Morrisey 
(in which the Court upheld certain minimum sentence requirements in the Criminal 
Code); Winnipeg Child and Family Services (in which the Court upheld statutory 
provisions permitting the apprehension of a new-born child); Darrach (in which 
the Court upheld provisions in the Criminal Code limiting the ability of an accused 
in a sexual assault case to introduce evidence of a complainant’s sexual history); 
and Harper (in which the Court overturned an injunction that had been granted, 
barring enforcement of certain provisions of the Canada Elections Act during the 
2000 federal election campaign).  
In addition to Little Sisters, there were two other successful Charter claims in 
the year 2000 cases. Both involved a challenge to government action, rather than 
legislation. In Arsenault-Cameron, a minister’s decision not to offer French 
language instruction was ruled invalid, while in Quebec (Commission des droits de 
la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City), section 15 of the 
Charter was relied upon in concluding that a hiring policy adopted by the City of 
Montreal could be challenged under Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms. 
2. Equality and Freedom of Expression 
A number of these cases are considered in some detail in the papers that follow. 
The paper by Chief Justice McLachlin considers the overall evolution of the 
Court’s section 15 jurisprudence. The Chief Justice suggests that although section 
15 has been in effect for 15 years, equality rights jurisprudence remains in its 
infancy. She argues that the Court’s jurisprudence has been founded on three 
bedrock principles: substantive equality, equality of effect and equality expressed 
both through like treatment and unlike treatment. Yet the Chief Justice also 
acknowledges that each of these principles comes with its own problems. The 
challenge for the courts, she suggests, is to elaborate a meaning of equality — 
which she terms the “most difficult” of Charter rights — in a manner that preserves 
our commitment to the concept while providing reasonable guidance to 
individuals, groups and legislatures.  
Many of the other papers in the first section of the book elaborate or comment 
upon specific aspects of the general themes introduced by the Chief Justice. The 
papers by David Corbett et al. and by Lori Sterling focus on the four equality 
rights cases handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada in the year 2000. 
Corbett et al. argue that the year’s equality rights cases break no significant new 
ground in the Court’s overall approach to section 15. However, Corbett et al. also 
argue that the cases reflect an overall deference for legislative choices, as 
contrasted with the more “activist” days of the Dickson and even Lamer Courts. 




Lori Sterling, who focuses specifically on the Lovelace case, suggests that it 
affirms and elaborates the framework that the Court has developed for section 15 
cases, most notably in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).7 
But Sterling also raises questions as to the extent to which the Court’s existing 
jurisprudence in this area provides sufficient guidance and clarity with respect to 
the meaning of equality.  
The only freedom of expression case handed down in the year 2000 was Little 
Sisters, which is examined in detail in the paper by Jamie Cameron. Cameron argues 
that the Court’s reasons in Little Sisters (as in the Sharpe case released in January 
2001)8 displayed an ambivalence towards the Charter guarantee of free expression: 
having found a breach of section 2(b) rights, Cameron argues that the Court failed to 
grant the claimant an effective remedy. On the other hand, Cameron suggests that the 
reasoning in these cases unquestionably made an effort to accommodate expressive 
freedom, which is a positive sign for the future.  
3. Legal Rights 
The four papers in Part II of the volume consider the Court’s recent Charter 
decisions in the legal rights area. The papers by Greenspan, Benedet and Paciocco 
vigorously debate the issue of whether the Court has been sufficiently vigilant in 
recent years in defending the rights of criminal accused. Both Greenspan and 
Paciocco argue that the Court has inappropriately moved away from its traditional 
role of defending criminal accused against the state and in favour of a model where 
the rights of victims are “balanced” against those of the accused, with the result 
that Charter protections are significantly weakened. In contrast, Janine Benedet 
argues that the Court’s recent performance in this area can be justified as reflecting 
a commitment to contextualize the interpretation of legal rights. The Court is 
attempting to take into account interests beyond those of the immediate parties to 
the case, a trend that Benedet argues is justifiable from both a human rights and 
criminal law perspective. 
The final paper in this section, by Richard Haigh, focuses on the recent Burns 
decision,9 in which the Court limited the discretion of the Minister of Justice to 
extradite fugitives to a death-penalty state. While Haigh welcomes the outcome of 
the case, he questions the reasoning employed by the Court, particularly its 
reluctance to expressly overrule earlier decisions which had reached a different 
result. Haigh uses the case as a springboard to discuss the general issue of the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to overrule 
7  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. 
8 See R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45. 
9  United States of America v. Burns (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2001 SCC 7. 
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previous decisions, an issue that has rarely received any extensive consideration 
from the Court. 
4. Evidentiary and Section 1 Issues 
The two essays in Part III consider evidentiary and section 1 issues in recent 
Charter cases. The paper by Danielle Pinard notes the paradox that despite the 
Supreme Court’s insistence on a “contextual” approach to Charter interpretation, it 
rarely considers empirical evidence of social context. Thus, while recent section 15 
cases focus on the effects of legislative distinctions on a claimant’s human dignity, 
the actual social or factual conditions experienced by claimants are apparently 
irrelevant to the Court’s analysis. Pinard argues that the Court has been more 
receptive to reasoning based on “common sense” or in some cases on “reasonable 
hypotheticals,” as opposed to empirical social facts. 
The paper by Chris Bredt and Adam Dodek on the use of section 1 of the 
Charter argues that the significance of section 1 has been reduced through the 
development of internal balancing tests in the definition of many of the substantive 
Charter rights. Bredt and Dodek consider not just equality rights claims, but also 
section 7 and section 2 cases, showing how in a wide variety of areas the outcome 
turns on how the Court chooses to define the substantive right that is at issue. They 
also advance a related but distinct claim that the Court in recent years has severely 
weakened the evidentiary test for governments to justify infringements of rights 
under section 1. 
5. Federalism and Constitutional Principles 
Turning from the Charter to federalism, there were four federalism cases handed 
down by the Supreme Court of Canada in the year 2000. All four of these cases 
involved challenges to legislation (as opposed to government decisions or 
conduct), and none of the challenges was successful: the federal Firearms Act was 
upheld; a challenge to provisions in the B.C. Securities Act providing for co-
operation with foreign securities regulators was rejected (Global Securities); a 
provincial scheme providing for the allocation of profits from a commercial casino 
located on First Nations lands was upheld (Lovelace); and a new scheme for 
funding public schools in Alberta was upheld (Public School Boards’ Assn.). 
The paper by Dean Hogg in this volume considers the Court’s reasoning in the 
Reference re Firearms Act case more closely, noting that the Court in this case 
continued a recent trend toward expanding the federal criminal law power well 
beyond its traditional, conventional limits. Warren Newman’s paper considers a 
development that has received increased emphasis in recent years, namely, the 
Court’s reliance on unwritten constitutional principles (as opposed to express 
provisions of the Constitution) as a basis for holding legislation to be invalid. 
While Newman suggests that this reliance on constitutional principles may have 
6 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
been taken too far in some instances, he also argues that reliance on unwritten 
constitutional principles is sometimes appropriate and consistent with our 
constitutional tradition.  
6. The Role of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(a) Activism and Restraint 
The papers in the final section of the volume take up various aspects of the 
debate that has developed in recent years over the appropriate role of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in constitutional adjudication. The opening paper by Chief Justice 
McMurtry of the Ontario Court of Appeal draws on his experience as one of the 
key architects of the 1982 constitutional changes. McMurtry recalls that the 
Ontario government of the day believed that the entrenchment of a Charter of 
Rights was desirable and valid, since it represented a balance between Canada’s 
dominant English and French legal traditions, and it reflected the plurality of the 
country as a whole. McMurtry also explains the role he played in early 1981 in 
lobbying the British government, with a view to encouraging the Canadian 
government to refer the proposed Charter to the Supreme Court of Canada for a 
ruling on its constitutional validity.  
Mary Dawson’s paper considers the impact the Charter has had on the practical 
operations of government. Dawson acknowledges that most Canadians would 
agree that the enactment of the Charter has been a good thing for Canada. Yet, the 
emergence of a rights culture has made the task of governing more complex and, in 
some cases, has led governments to feel that they have lost control of their own 
agenda. This loss of control is a product of the sheer volume of rights cases, as 
well as of the fact that the cases appear to arise randomly and without sufficient 
advance warning. Dawson explores the nature of these and other concerns, and 
suggests that the central challenge is how to respect individual and group rights 
while at the same time maintaining the commitment of all citizens to their larger 
community and ensuring that governments can respond adequately to the needs of 
that community. 
Finally, the papers by Ryder, Roach and Manfredi directly engage the debate 
over whether the Supreme Court has been unduly “activist” in its recent decisions. 
Both Ryder and Roach claim that while the Court has certainly been activist in a 
variety of areas, this activism has been a necessary by-product of the increased 
responsibilities that were thrust on the Supreme Court of Canada in 1982. In 
contrast, Manfredi argues that the defences of judicial power that have been 
advanced by judges and lawyers are often based on myths designed to disguise the 
fact that the growing public policy role of the Court is producing outcomes skewed 
in favour of judicial as opposed to legislative preferences. 




(b) Unanimity and Dissent on the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court was unanimous in eight of the 13 constitutional decisions in 
the past year, which is consistent with the Court’s established pattern of high 
unanimity in its decision-making, in both the constitutional and non-constitutional 
area. (The Court is unanimous in approximately 70% of its decisions generally, 
which is similar to the unanimity rate in the House of Lords, but is far higher than 
the 40% unanimity rate for the United States Supreme Court.) All four of the year 
2000 federalism decisions were unanimous, and five of the 10 Charter cases were 
unanimous. 
Closer analysis of the five Charter cases in which the Court was divided is 
useful for identifying differences in the constitutional philosophies of the different 
members of the Court. The first point of significance is that the Charter claimant 
enjoyed limited success in these five divided cases. In four of the five (Morrisey, 
Winnipeg Child and Family, Blencoe, and Harper), the Charter claim was rejected 
outright, while in the fifth, Little Sisters, the majority took a narrower view of the 
Charter claim than did the dissent. There were three members of the Court, 
namely, Justices L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Bastarache, who were in the 
majority in each of the divided cases in which they participated. Conversely, the 
dissents in these five cases were limited to Justice Arbour (dissented in three 
cases); Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Lebel (dissented in two cases); and 
Justices Iacobucci, Major and Binnie (one dissent each). In all five cases in which 
the Court was divided, the “direction” of the dissent was in favour of the Charter 
claimant (i.e., the minority took a more generous or expansive view of the Charter 
claimant’s case than did the majority). Of some significance, perhaps, is the fact 
that the two newest members of the Court, Justices Arbour and Lebel, are clearly 
prepared to dissent from the majority, and would appear (at this early point in their 
careers on the Court) to be relatively strong advocates for the rights of Charter 
claimants. 
7. Intervenors in the Supreme Court of Canada10 
(a) Frequency of Interventions 
The frequency and number of interventions in constitutional cases in the 
Supreme Court of Canada increased in 2000, despite a 1999 announcement by the 
Court that it would be limiting such appearances in the future.  
Intervenors participated in 11 of the 13 constitutional cases in the year 2000, 
with 75 different entities appearing as intervenor a total of 107 times. That total 
was up significantly from 1999, when 52 entities had appeared a total of 81 times 
10 Intervenors are governments, persons or groups that are not directly involved in a case, but 
who are given the right to file written materials and sometimes to make oral argument before the Court. 
8 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
in 13 constitutional cases that year. In fact, as Table 1 below indicates, there were 
more interventions in constitutional cases in 2000 than at any time since 1996.  
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1996 38 109 
1997 52 73 
1998 51 89 
1999 52 81 
2000 75 107 
1996-2000 19011 458 
 
As Table 2 below indicates, over the previous four-year period (1996-99), 
intervenors had appeared in just over one-half (60 of 112) of the constitutional 
cases handed down by the Court. Table 3 shows that there were a total of 352 
interventions over the 1996-99 period, an average of approximately six for each 
case in which an intervenor was granted status. Those numbers increased in 2000, 
with an average of over nine interventions (107 interventions in 11 cases) for each 
constitutional case in which an intervenor participated.  
TABLE 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES WITH INTERVENORS 1996-2000 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1996-2000 
20/46 11/23 16/25 13/18 11/13 72/125 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
11 Note that this number refers to the number of separate entities that have appeared as an 
intervenor over the five-year period examined; an intervenor that appears in more than one year will 
only be counted once in the 1996-2000 total. 






























1996 109  58  22 0 3 14 12 
1997  73  33  34 0 3  3  0 
1998  89  51  29 1 0  4  4 
1999  81  29  38 5 2  6  1 
2000 107  70  30 1 0  5  1 
TOTAL 459 241 153 7 8 32 18 
 
(b) No Evidence of Court Crackdown on Intervenors 
What makes these findings noteworthy is that in September of 1999, the 
Supreme Court of Canada had issued a “Notice to the Profession” indicating that in 
the future it would strictly enforce the time limits on the filing of applications to 
intervene. The Court’s Notice also reminded proposed intervenors that they were 
required to “describe their interest in the appeal or reference and ... required to set 
out the submissions to be advanced, their relevancy to the appeal or reference and 
the reasons for believing that these submissions will be useful to the Court and 
different from those of the parties.”12 The Notice further reminded proposed 
intervenors that unless specifically ordered, an intervenor would be permitted to 
make written submissions only and not present oral argument. The Court 
concluded by noting that the “strict enforcement of Rule 1813 will ensure that the 
interests of both parties and interveners are safeguarded.”  
In light of the September 1999 Notice, many observers had expected the Court 
to adopt a significantly more restrictive approach to the granting of intervenor 
status in the future. Yet thus far there is no evidence of any such shift, with the 
number of interventions in 2000 actually increasing slightly. Moreover, in 99 of 
the 107 appearances by intervenors this past year, the organization was given the 
right to make oral argument, in addition to filing written briefs.14 This was 
_______________________________________________________________ 
12  Supreme Court of Canada Bulletin of Proceedings, September 10, 1999, at 1313. 
13 Rule 18 of the Supreme Court Rules sets out the rules and procedures for applications to 
intervene. 
14 The following intervenors submitted written materials only in the year 2000: (i) in Global 
Securities Corp. v. British Columbia Securities Commission, supra, note 2, the Attorney General of 
Nova Scotia; (ii) in Lovelace v. Ontario, supra, note 2, the Council of Canadians with Disabilities, the 
Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and the Métis National Council of Women; and (iii) in Public 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) Constitutional Cases 2000 11 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
somewhat surprising in light of the Court’s specific reminder to intervenors in 
1999 that there would be no right to oral argument by an intervenor unless 
specifically ordered. 
(c) Who Are the Intervenors? 
As noted in last year’s review of the Court’s constitutional caseload,15 
governments (as opposed to private parties) are in fact the most common 
intervenors in constitutional cases. This results from the fact that the Attorneys 
General of Canada, the provinces and territories have an automatic right to 
intervene in any Supreme Court case raising a constitutional question. Slightly 
more than one-half of the intervenors in the year 2000 (41 of 75 intervenors) were 
governments, including the Government of Canada (five interventions), eight of 
the provinces (Ontario and Manitoba with seven interventions each, B.C. with six, 
Quebec with five, Saskatchewan with three, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia each 
with two, and Alberta with one) and two territories (NWT and the Yukon with one 
intervention each). The remaining intervenors in the government category in 2000 
were government agencies, tribunals, school boards or municipalities. 
Over the past five years (1996-2000), the Attorney General of Quebec has been 
the most frequent government intervenor, appearing in 33 cases, followed by the 
Attorney General of Canada (30 appearances), British Columbia (29 appearances), 
Ontario (26 appearances) and Alberta (21 appearances). Clearly, these five 
governments have both the interest and the resources to vigorously defend their 
constitutional interests before the Supreme Court of Canada. The four Atlantic 
provinces, Nova Scotia (with four interventions over the past five years), Prince 
Edward Island (with three), New Brunswick (with three) and Newfoundland (with 
two) are the provincial governments least likely to intervene before the Supreme 
Court of Canada in constitutional matters. 
Apart from governments, non-profit organizations, including registered charities, 
political advocacy groups, industry associations and other non-profit groups, are the 
single largest category of intervenor. In the year 2000, there were 27 non-profit 
organizations that intervened before the Supreme Court in constitutional cases. 
Within this category there are two organizations that stand out in particular as 
frequent intervenors: the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA, a non-profit 
organization, and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), a charity 
registered under the Income Tax Act (Canada). These two organizations have 
intervened in a total of 17 cases over the past five years (the CCLA nine times, and 
School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), supra, note 2, the Attorneys General of 
B.C., Manitoba, Quebec and New Brunswick. 
15 See Monahan, “The Supreme Court of Canada in 1999: The Year in Review” (2000), 8 
Canada Watch 3. 
12 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
LEAF eight times); in contrast, no other non-government organization has appeared 
in more than five cases over this time period. Moreover, what distinguishes both the 
CCLA and LEAF from all other intervenors is the fact that they appear in a wide 
range of constitutional litigation, including both criminal and non-criminal matters, 
and litigation raising a wide variety of different constitutional provisions. Other 
organizations that have appeared in more than a single case have restricted their 
interventions to a particular category or class of litigation falling within some area of 
specialized interest or expertise. 
The other significant category of intervenor before the Supreme Court is aboriginal 
organizations. There were five aboriginal organizations that intervened in 
constitutional cases last year, bringing the total interventions by aboriginal 
organizations over the past five years to 32. 
Also in the year 2000, there was one intervention by a trade union, and one by 
an individual. 
(d) Intervenors More Successful than Charter Claimants 
An important question that arises is whether the presence of intervenors makes a 
difference to case outcomes. While it is extremely difficult to accurately measure 
such a variable, one approximation is to examine the extent to which the positions 
taken by non-government intervenors are accepted by the Court, and compare that 
to the success rate of individuals asserting Charter claims.16 On this measure, non-
government intervenors appear to enjoy considerably more success than do Charter 
claimants. For example, over the past two years, the position taken by non-
government intervenors in constitutional cases has been accepted by the Court 
approximately 58% of the time (51.5 of the 89 interventions by non-government 
intervenors in 1999-2000 were accepted by the Court). This can be contrasted with 
the overall success rate for Charter claimants, which stands at 33%. In short, over 
the past two years the Court has been significantly more likely to accept the 
position taken by an intervenor than it has that of a Charter claimant. 
TABLE 4 










1999 21/29 28/52 5/14 
_______________________________________________________________ 
16 Restricting the comparison to non-government intervenors is appropriate, since Charter 
claimants are all non-government entities. 
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2000 44.5/70 23.5/37 3/10 
TOTAL 65.5/99 (66%) 51.5/89 (58%) 8/24 (33%) 
 
Significantly, intervenors are more likely to oppose than support the position put 
forward by the primary litigant in a constitutional case. For example, in the year 
2000 cases, the intervenor supported the claimant in only 41 of the 107 
appearances by intervenors. This partly reflects the fact that the majority of 
intervenors are governments, which will tend to support the position adopted by a 
government defendant in a constitutional case. But even private intervenors will 
frequently oppose the position put by a claimant and argue in support of the 
government’s position that the legislation or government action under 
consideration is constitutionally valid. For example, in Blencoe, all three of the 
private intervenors (along with the seven government intervenors in the case) 
opposed the position put forward by the Charter claimant in that case. Similarly, in 
Darrach, the four private intervenors, along with the four government intervenors, 
took the position that the Charter claim should not be accepted by the Court. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Stepping back and considering the Court’s overall work product, the message 
from the Court’s year 2000 constitutional cases is one of restraint and caution. In 
controversial or divided cases, the view that prevailed was the view less favourable 
to the Charter claimant. There was little evidence of the sort of activism that has 
prompted critics in previous years to complain that the Court was encroaching on 
the prerogatives of the legislature. Nevertheless, as has been made plain in the 
recent past, the trend of the Court’s decisions in a particular year is not necessarily 
indicative of how the Court will rule in the future, which suggests that the public 
and academic debate over the Court’s role is likely to continue in the years ahead. 
